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We investigate how family and non-family small-and-medium size enterprises (SMEs) 
differ in their preference for patenting over secrecy as a means to protect value of 
intellectual property, and how proactive orientation moderates this relationship. Because 
secrecy carries more risks for spillover than patenting, we propose and provide evidence 
to suggest that family SMEs are more likely to use patents than secrecy relative to non-
family SMEs as a mechanism to protect value. However, proactive orientation can 
weaken this relationship, since SMEs with a proactive orientation will avoid the 
disclosure of information required for patenting. Using a sample of 300 SMEs from four 
countries in the wine industry, we find support for our hypotheses and contribute to both 
the intellectual property (IP) and SME literatures by explaining how family SMEs relative 
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Introduction 
Literature on intellectual property (IP) rights has revealed that secrecy, i.e. 
intentionally withholding information on intellectual property from those external to the 
firm (Bos et al., 2015), is a more prevalent method of firms’ protecting the value of IP 
than patenting (Alcácer et al., 2017; Cohen et al., 2002; Hall et al., 2014). However, 
although a number of contingency factors have been considered in the patenting literature 
such as country differences (Cohen et al., 2002; Crowley, 2004), industry differences 
(Alcácer et al., 2017) or innovation types (Arundel, 2001), a major focus has been placed 
on large firms. Only a few studies have sought to understand when small-and-medium 
size enterprises (SMEs) would prefer to use secrecy as a means of IP value protection 
over patenting (Gan et al., 2013; Leiponen and Byma, 2009). Thus, our understanding of 
the factors that motivate SMEs to select patents rather than secrecy or visa versa is 
limited.  
Furthermore, we know even less about the impact SMEs’ firm-level factors have 
upon their preference for protecting IP with patents or secrecy than we do on macro-
factors. For example, such a preference may be influenced by whether SMEs are family 
owned-or-controlled or not (Howorth et al., 2010). Recent work has examined how family 
involvement, as an informal mechanisms or institution, moderates the relationship 
between the strength of formal IP in a country and firms’ R&D resource allocation 
decisions (Brinkerink and Rondi, 2020). However, R&D decisions are related to SMEs’ 
inputs to the innovation process and not the mechanism they select to protect the IP once 
it has been developed. Hence, more research is needed to understand the differences 
between SMEs that are family firms and those that are non-family firms in their 
preferences for patenting or secrecy as a means to protect their IP. 
A second firm level factor that may be relevant to SMEs’ choice between patents 
and secrecy as a mechanism to protect IP is their proactive orientations. The SME 
literature has differentiated between family firms and their non-family counterparts based 
on their entrepreneurial behaviour (Howorth et al., 2010, 2014; Melin et al., 2014) and 
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one element of entrepreneurial behavior is proactive orientation (De Massis et al., 2014; 
Naldi et al., 2007). However prior research has not analysed the impact of a proactive 
orientation upon the choice between patenting and secrecy in family firms. Thus, we 
integrate the research that has been conducted on the different means of value protection 
of IP and the SME literature to develop theory to explain why family firms (vs. non-
family firms) are more likely to prefer patenting over secrecy to protect and capture value 
from IP. We also consider how proactive orientation moderates that relationship. For our 
purposes we limit our theorising to SMEs and posit that understanding the conditions 
under which one method or another is preferred is important for SMEs in general and 
family firms in particular, in order to avoid failures in value protection and capture from 
IP. 
We chose the wine industry as our research context for two reasons. First, secrecy 
can be and is a widely acknowledged means of value protection and capture for core 
products in this industry for both the wine-making “recipes” or proprietary blends and 
production methods. Studies have largely overlooked the fact that SME managers in the 
wine industry can anticipate and react to a changing competitive environment by either 
safeguarding their 'exclusive' and 'secret' recipes for winemaking by keeping them secret 
or by applying for patents. Second, the wine industry is dominated by SMEs most of 
which are family firms and controlled by family members (Cordano et al., 2010; Thach, 
2015; Williams and Spielmann, 2019). Furthermore, wine experts distinguish between 
two distinct wine producing locations: the Old World (where wine has been produced for 
centuries such as in France and Italy) and the New World (where winemaking is relatively 
new, such as Canada, UK, USA and Denmark) (Spielman et al., 2019). This is especially 
important, because prior literature suggests that the use of secrecy is highly country-
specific (Cohen et al., 2002; Crowley, 2004) and countries have been associated with 
three different levels in terms of legal enforcement of IP rights (La Porta et al., 1998). 
Thus, we chose to include wineries and vineyards from four countries in the study to 
control for country-level effects. Consequently, we conducted a survey with 300 wine 
SMEs in Italy, France, the United States, and Denmark. These countries have different 
legal environments in terms of the strength of their legal system in enforcing IP, e.g., 
Denmark has the strongest legal system, followed by the US, in turn followed by France 
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and Italy (La Porta et al., 1998). This selection of countries enhances the generalisability 
of the results across different legal environments. 
Our study contributes to both the IP and SME literatures by explaining how SMEs 
protect and capture value from IP. Value capturing studies in the innovation literature on 
IP have primarily focused on country, industry, and innovation type, and have overlooked 
the impact of firm-level characteristics upon the choice of patenting relative to secrecy as 
a means of value protect and capture from IP. The SME literature has had limited research 
on value protection and capture, in particular preferences for patenting versus secrecy in 
family relative to none-family SMEs. This article addresses these important gaps in the 
literature by considering the importance of two firm-level characteristics on the choice of 
patenting versus secrecy: family SMEs relative to non-family SMEs and the SMEs’ 
proactive orientation. Our findings suggest that SME type in terms of family versus non-
family, and the SMEs’ proactive orientation both influence their choice of value 
protection and capture mechanism, i.e. when they prefer patents relative to secrecy.  
In the sections below, we first briefly review the relevant literature on IP rights 
and the mechanisms used to protect and capture value from IP. We then discuss the SME 
literature on family firms to develop theory and propose the direct effect of family firms 
relative to non-family firms on the preference for using patenting instead of secrecy as a 
means of value protection and capture. We follow this by developing theory to propose 
how proactive orientation moderates this relationship. Next, we describe our study and 
report our findings. We conclude by discussing our contribution to the literature, the 
study’s limitations, and future research directions. 
 
Theoretical background and hypotheses development 
The choice between secrecy and patenting 
Recent innovation research suggests that innovative products and practices are 
expected to be safeguarded through different strategies and mechanisms (Bos et al., 
2015), including secrecy and patenting. Patenting and secrecy are considered strategies 
that proactive firms use to protect their knowledge (Sofka et al., 2018; Veugelers and 
Schneider, 2018). In particular, the IP rights research suggests that firm managers 
explicitly consider the risk and reward probabilities associated with the choice of secrecy 
in order to maximize their expected utility (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993), and also weigh 
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the risks associated with secrecy against the limitations of patent protection (Denicolò 
and Franzoni, 2004). Most businesses keep and protect secrets, spanning all functional 
areas of the business (Crittenden et al., 2015), because secrecy may limit external access 
to internal knowledge and capabilities and help retain advantages over competitors and 
other parties over time. Relatedly, innovation research has paid substantial attention to 
patenting (Holgersson, 2013) in the context of SMEs, suggesting that formal IP rights in 
the form of patenting may signal the quality of the firm and their conformity with high-
level industry (technical) standards (Gick, 2008), and has also argued that SMEs find 
secrecy more useful for protecting their IP than patenting (Leiponen and Byma, 2009).  
While a few studies in the innovation literature have looked at when SMEs choose 
secrecy over patenting or vice versa (Gan et al., 2013; Leiponen and Byma, 2009), there 
have been contradictory findings regarding the relationship between family firms and the 
propensity to patent (Bannò, 2016; Tognazzo et al., 2013). Patenting requires the 
“disclosure of the knowledge associated with the innovation and prevents imitation 
through the threat of punishment in court” (Sofka et al., 2018: 559), but family firms may 
be unwilling to disclose information associated with their innovations. For example, 
family firms in the wine industry often have family recipes that have been handed down 
from generation to generation, which family members do not want to disclose publicly 
for fear other firms will imitate their recipe (Woodfield and Husted, 2017). Furthermore, 
according to the behavioural agency perspective, family firms must weigh the benefits of 
their investment decisions in terms of prospective financial wealth such as sustained 
economic gains, isolating mechanisms, and quality signals against the costs of those 
investments in terms of potential losses of current socio-emotional wealth (Ardito et al., 
2019). Socio-emotional wealth refers to non-financial aspects of the firm that help to meet 
the family's affective needs, such as their identity, the ability for the family to exercise 
influence, and the perpetuation of the family dynasty (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). The 
loss of socio-emotional wealth, due to the loss of a sense of control, can result in the 
diversion of resources and the disclosing of information by management, legal challenges 
for family members, and the need for specialized human capital to address the various 
issues between various stakeholders (Chirico et al., 2018).  
On the other hand, secrecy has received less attention than patenting in the SME 
literature on family firms. Secrecy as a means of value protection is very different from 
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patenting. For example, James et al. (2013: 1132) argued that protecting and capturing 
value using secrecy involves the “use of internal policies and procedures that restrict the 
flow of information both within and outside the organization”. In their study of the 
relationship between ownership structure and voluntary disclosure of intellectual capital, 
Gan and colleagues (2013) found that family-owned firms strictly adhere to secrecy 
whenever possible by disclosing no more details than stipulated by law. Still, it is 
surprising how little SME research has considered the use of secrecy by family firms and 
when patenting is used instead of secrecy, given it is considered an important mechanism 
that firms use to maximize the portion of the value they capture from their IP.  
The lack of discussion around when SMEs prefer patenting over secrecy and how  
proactive orientation influences this preference is surprising, because secrecy is closely 
associated with family dynamics that tend to characterise family firms (Kets de Vries, 
1993; Ward, 1997). For this reason, some scholars have assumed that family firms 
demonstrate a major propensity towards secrecy (Casillas et al., 2011; Sharma and 
Manikutty, 2005), since the firm’s ownership and leadership are typically passed down 
from generation to generation within the family, protecting the secret recipe of the family 
firm (Woodfield and Husted, 2017). However, this assumption remains relatively 
unexplored and the bases for this assumption have not been empirically tested. Thus, in 
this paper, we develop and test theory regarding family firms’ preference for using 
patenting relative to secrecy to protect IP, and how a proactive orientation moderates this 
relationship.  
 
Family versus non-family SMEs 
Research acknowledges the influence of family involvement and participation in 
SME management and development (Basco, 2014; Howorth et al., 2010). While there is 
no widely accepted family firm definition, studies have revealed that family firms differ 
from non-family firms by the interconnected nature of family and business dynamics 
(Howorth et al., 2010; Intihar and Pollack, 2012). Most definitions for family firms have 
been based on either family ownership,  management control by family members, or some 
combination of these two criteria with other related ones (Hernández-Linares et al., 2018; 
Hernández-Linares and López-Fernández, 2018). Whatever the measure used, studies 
defining SMEs as family firms suggest that members of a family in a SME have control 
6 
 
over the decisions and resources that affect the firm in the long term and family members 
hold top management positions that enable them to influence and execute strategic 
choices (Howorth et al., 2010). The uniqueness of family firms is related to the amount 
of weight the founders and their families have in deciding the way the company operates 
and differentiates itself from other firms over time (Fletcher, 2002).  
Agency theory and the resource-based view are two theories commonly used in 
family business research to explain different characteristics of family firms that are likely 
to affect innovation output (Matzler et al., 2015) and their entrepreneurial orientation 
(Hernández-Linares and López-Fernández, 2018). Particularly, literature has 
differentiated family SMEs from their non-family counterparts based on their 
entrepreneurial behaviour (Howorth et al., 2014; Melin et al., 2014). More specifically, 
research suggests that family firms are less entrepreneurial and less innovative since they 
have a long term orientation, tend to be more conservative, more risk-averse (Kraiczy et 
al., 2015; Naldi et al., 2007; Zahra, 2005), and less able to adapt to market changes 
(Lubatkin et al., 2007). Research also suggests that there is a negative relationship 
between family involvement and investments in R&D (Block, 2012; Chen and Hsu, 
2009). Nevertheless, there is no clear consensus, because other research considers the 
long term orientation of family firms as evidence of their longstanding commitment to 
innovation (Llach and Nordqvist, 2010; Nordqvist et al., 2008). However, it is also likely 
that the risk-aversiveness of family firms will also affect the choices family firms make 
on how to innovate and whether to protect the value of IP using patenting or secrecy. 
The IP rights literature tells us that the primary risk associated with using secrecy 
rather than patents to protect IP is that the secret may spillover to competitors, who then 
can place the same product on the market (Hall et al., 2014). Because family firms tend 
to be risk-averse and secrecy typically carries more risks for spillover than patenting 
(Naldi et al., 2007; Zahra, 2005), we propose that family firms are more likely to use 
patents relative to secrecy as a mechanism to capture value. Because family firms are 
often more conservative and less willing to take risks than non-family firms, we posit that 
risk aversion may motivate them to protect the family’s interest by patenting their 
products and processes in a way that can be protected by the legal system. We hypothesise 
that family firms are willing to incur the significant costs of patenting in order to retain 
control over their firms and protect their socio-emotional wealth (Block et al., 2013). 
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In addition, in family firms, the majority of the equity is typically owned by family 
members and may have been in the family for generations (Llach and Nordqvist, 2010; 
Zahra et al., 2004). Under these conditions, even family members that are not responsible 
for day-to-day management of the firm are likely to see the business as their family’s 
heritage, and believe that it is their responsibility to involve themselves in the decisions 
made by the firm (Basco, 2014). Family members that are involved in the management 
of the firm also often do not have a diversified financial portfolio or diversified human 
capital, both of which can foster risk aversion (Schmid et al., 2014). This tendency toward 
risk aversion may lead family members, managers and non-managers, to take actions on 
behalf of the firm to preserve the status quo and continue to do things as they have always 
been done them despite the potential for a stronger economic performance if changes 
were made (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). Thus, family managers are more likely than non-
family managers to introduce management processes that help the firm to survive as a 
family firm across generations (Jell et al., 2015).  
Alternatively, in the case of non-family firms, the agent-managers often have a 
more limited ownership stake and less personal affiliations with other equity owners 
(Casillas et al., 2011). As a result, while family members running a family firm can be 
expected to be more concerned about their family’s ownership, identity, or 
socioeconomic wealth in the business and be less willing to take risks, managers of non-
family firms may be more willing to take risks in the hopes of greater short-term profits 
(Jell et al., 2015), which is often linked to their compensation. Given that patents provide 
legal protection against rivals imitating the firm’s products and processes and, thus, can 
be used as an isolating mechanism (Lippman and Rumelt, 2003), more conservative risk-
averse family firms can be expected to choose patenting over secrecy more so than non-
family firms. From these arguments, we propose that: 
H1: Family SMEs (as compared to non-family SMEs) consider patenting a more 
effective means than secrecy for protecting and capturing value from intellectual 
property. 
 
Proactive orientation as a moderator 
Family firms’ proactive behaviour can provide them with significant advantages 
relative to other firms in terms of their ability to pioneer practices that affect the 
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perception of products or services by customers (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988) and 
allow them to capture value (James et al., 2013). A proactive orientation “refers to an 
opportunity-seeking, forward-looking behaviour that incorporates acting on future needs 
and trends ahead of competitors, thereby actively entering new product/market spaces, 
creating first-mover advantages, and seeking market leadership positions” (Lomberg et 
al., 2017: 3). Furthermore, Miller (1983: 771) posited that firms that engage in product-
market innovation and undertake somewhat risky approaches may be the first to come up 
with ‘proactive’ innovations, thereby “beating competitors to the punch”. Thus, a 
proactive orientation could motivate family firms to choose secrecy over patenting as a 
means of protecting their IP. 
There is no consensus in the SME literature on the relationship between family 
firms relative to non-family firms and proactive orientation. While some authors claim 
that family firms are less entrepreneurial and innovative (Carney, 2005; Garcés-galdeano 
et al., 2016; Naldi et al., 2007), other streams of literature discuss that family firms may 
pursue more R&D activities and be more innovative than non-family counterparts (Llach 
and Nordqvist, 2010; Nordqvist et al., 2008). De Massis and colleagues (2014) reviewed 
two literature streams related to the proactive orientation of family firms: the stewardship 
perspective, which recognises a proactive search for opportunities by family firms; and 
the agency theory perspective, which considers family firms as conservative and risk-
averse, not devoted to the search of opportunities. 
The literature arguing that family firms are more innovative than non-family ones 
relies mainly on their long-term orientation. As family firms tend to be long-term 
oriented, they dedicate resources for innovation in the short-term, thereby fostering 
entrepreneurship (Llach and Nordqvist, 2010). In doing so, they will seek to keep the 
business updated to market needs, reflecting a dynamic interplay, so that the family 
business can be passed from generation to generation (Llach and Nordqvist, 2010; Zahra 
et al., 2004) through a bounded intergenerational reciprocity process to share the accrued 
family value (Janjuha-Jivraj and Spence, 2009). Thus, the desire to create 
transgenerational value and long-lasting firms may encourage family firms to proactively 




Zahra and colleagues (2004) examined the importance of organizational culture 
in family vs. non-family firms and entrepreneurship. Using data from U.S. manufacturing 
companies, they found that there was a positive linear relationship between 
entrepreneurship and a long- versus short-term orientation. A long- versus short-term 
orientation had more impact upon entrepreneurship in family firms when compared with 
non-family firms. Hence, long-term oriented family firms may seek to be more proactive 
and entrepreneurial than non-family firms. In the same way, Casillas and colleagues 
(2011) found that when family members from the next generation are involved in running 
the family business, the entrepreneurial orientation is stronger. Chrisman and Patel (2012) 
showed that when family firms attach more importance to long-term family goals, they 
are more willing to make risky decisions. It follows then that if a family firm has a long-
term orientation, it will be more entrepreneurial and proactive in its efforts to make short-
term investments that will affect its long-term viability, and that this will lead the 
managers to be less sensitive to the risks protected by patenting and more willing to 
protect and capture value through secrecy. 
The effect of a proactive orientation might also be stronger in family firms than 
in non-family firms, because of the risk of losing socio-emotional wealth (Chrisman and 
Patel, 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). Gómez-Mejía and his colleagues (2007) drew on 
the concept of socio-emotional wealth to explain the trade-off family firms make between 
risk aversion and a long-term orientation. Defining socio-emotional wealth as the non-
financial aspects of the firm that meet the family’s affective needs, they suggested that 
family firms will embrace risky decisions that preserve emotional ties even though those 
decisions decrease long-term economic wealth. Likewise, they suggest family firms will 
avoid risky decisions that reduce socio-emotional wealth even if those decisions may 
increase long-term economic wealth. While family firms are commonly risk averse, 
Gómez-Mejía and his colleagues (2007) argue that the situation might change when their 
socio-emotional wealth is threatened (Craig et al., 2014).  
Although patenting might lead to some socio-emotional gains, these gains are 
unlikely to counterbalance the potential loss of control associated with patenting and 
family firms’ aversion to possible socio-emotional wealth losses. The potential loss of 
control and socio-emotional wealth should lead to a lower propensity to patent, though 
there might be specific conditions that favor an alignment between multiple goals 
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(Chirico et al., 2018). As a result of the commitment to protect their socio-emotional 
wealth, a strong proactive orientation is likely to attenuate the preference of family firms 
relative to non-family firms for patenting versus secrecy as an instrument to protect and 
capture value. This will allow them to avoid the disclosure of information required to 
receive patents.  
Family firms may prefer privacy over patenting relative to non-family firms for 
other reasons (Envick et al., 2008), especially in the wine industry. In this industry 
proactive family firms may well have a set of closely guarded activities developed over 
generations, which include unpatented or unpatentable tacit knowledge around a product 
or production process, which the family firm may not want to reveal to others in the same 
industry. The IP literature has evidenced a high degree of cross-functionality in patent 
management in family firms that might imply secrecy provides a more effective 
protection for their inventions than patents (Jell et al., 2015). Furthermore, family firms 
in the wine-making industry may be more proactive in leading and implementing 
innovative wine-making practices or trying to unlock the secrets of new ways of 
producing, commercializing and enjoying wine (Hall et al., 2015; Jackson, 2017), because 
they seek to enhance and build on the heritage of their family firm. 
Thus, we propose that the relationship between family firms and a preference for 
patenting over secrecy will be moderated by SMEs’ proactive orientation. Specifically, 
we posit that increases in proactive orientation will make family firms (as compared to 
non-family firms) less likely to prefer patenting over secrecy. Thus, we propose that: 
H2: The more proactive the SMEs’ orientation, the weaker the relationship 
between family SMEs (as compared to non-family SMEs) and their preference for 
patenting relative to secrecy as a more effective means for protecting and 
capturing value from intellectual property. 
 
Methodology 
Sample and Data Collection 
The wine industry represented the ideal research setting for our analysis, as the 
use of secrecy is common in this industry, where recipes and techniques can be kept as a 
secret (Vrontis and Paliwoda, 2008). We used survey data on 300 SMEs from four 
countries: the United States, Italy, Denmark and France. Since prior literature has shown 
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great differences across countries in the use of secrecy (Cohen et al., 2002; Crowley, 
2004), a multi-country study is likely to ensure greater generalisability of the findings. 
The four countries are also associated with three different levels in terms of law 
enforcement of IP rights. Scandinavia (i.e. Denmark) is considered in the top-tier in terms 
of law enforcement, followed by common law countries (i.e United States) and then by 
the French civil law countries (i.e. to which France and Italy belong) (La Porta et al., 
1998). Therefore, by choosing these four countries we can rule out that our results depend 
on the level of law enforcement of IP in an individual country.  
The survey was developed in English, and then translated into Italian, Danish, and 
French, and then back-translated into English. This procedure was done to avoid 
mistranslations and bias based on language errors. Furthermore, interviews in each 
country were conducted to support the back-translation process (Brislin, 1970; Chidlow 
et al., 2014). The process of gathering the data differed somewhat in each country to better 
consider the local conditions and based on learning. First, data was collected in the United 
States. A random stratified sample of 1,000 firms from four States (North Carolina, 
Virginia, Oregon, and California) was first mailed post cards and then called on the 
telephone to ask if they would participate in the study. From that population, 
approximately 20% of the firms were no longer in business, and only 77 wineries and 
vineyards agreed to participate in the study after multiple telephone calls. A link to an 
online questionnaire was sent to those willing participants. Twenty seven firms 
completing the questionnaire (response rate = 35% for those that agreed to participate), 
but only 25 were included in our analysis due to missing data.  
Second, data was collected in Itally, where the survey was also administered 
through an online questionnaire. Due to the high number of wineries and vineyards in this 
country (over 92,000), the survey sample consisted of 800 firms in the 10 main winery 
consortia located in five main regions of Italy (Emilia Romagna, Lombardia, Sicilia, 
Toscana, and Veneto). From that sample, 246 firms completed the online survey 
(response rate = 30.75%). However, only 137 of these had sufficient data to be included 
in our analysis. 
 Third, we collected data in Denmark, where the invitation to participate in the 
study was extended to all the wineries and vineyards (70 firms), which were members of 
the two national wine associations. The associations first contacted their member firms 
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through e-mail. After some follow-up e-mails and phone calls by one of the co-authors, 
managers of 51 firms used the link they were sent to complete the online questionnaire 
(response rate = 72%), although only 31 had complete data and could be used in this 
study.  
Finally, in France, a random stratified sample of 500 firms were contacted by 
telephone and invited to participate in a telephone interview where the study questions 
would be asked and recorded. Telephone interviews were used instead of the online 
survey because of concerns that the firm managers would not participate unless the 
interviews were done in person. A professional market research firm was hired to conduct 
telephone interviews. In total, 107 wineries and vineyards agreed to participate in the 
study (21.4% of those telephoned) and all of them completed the questionnaire and were 
used in this study.  
Thus, in total, sample used in our analysis consists of 300 observations: 25 from 
the U.S., 137 from Italy, 31 from Denmark, and 107 from France. There are several 
reasons for the differences in response rates among the 4 countries we sampled. First, 
there was a certain amount of learning-by-doing, starting data collection in the US, 
followed by Italy, Denmark and France. Second, the US population of wineries have been 
oversampled for studies by US academics, while wineries in the other three countries 
have been comparatively less investigated. Third, Denmark is a small producer of wine 
relative to the other three countries. Furthermore, the Danish population is well known 
for their active participation in surveys for both their government and fellow academics.  
To examine whether common method bias was an issue (Podsakoff et al., 2003), 
we conducted a principal component factor analysis of the survey items used in the study, 
which revealed the presence of eight distinct factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0, 
rather than a single factor. The eight factors together accounted for 69% of the total 
variance; the first (largest) factor did not account for a majority of the variance (15%). 
Thus, no general factor is apparent, suggesting that common method bias was not a 
problem in this study. 
 
Variables and Measures 
Dependent variable  
The extent to which firms use patenting relative to secrecy is our dependent 
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variable (Patenting/(Patenting+Secrecy)). Consistent with prior survey studies (Alcácer 
et al., 2017; Arundel, 2001), we captured the use of secrecy through the question: “To 
what extent were trade secrets effective for maintaining or increasing firm 
competitiveness of product and process innovations over the last three years?” 
Respondents assessed the use of secrecy on a 4-point Likert scale where 1 indicates “not 
used” and 4 “high effectiveness”. With the same approach, we assessed the use of 
patenting as a source of competitiveness of product and process innovations on a 4-point 
Likert scale. Our dependent variable Patenting/(Patenting+Secrecy) is therefore 
constructed by dividing patenting by the sum of patenting and secrecy.  
 
Independent variables and moderators 
The literature has not established a single criterion to conceptualise and 
operationalise family firms. Many studies measure either the ownership of the firm held 
by family members and/or the number of family members in management positions 
(Hernández-Linares et al., 2018). However, other researchers have highlighted other 
features to define a family firm, such as the governance structure or the continuity of 
family ownership (Block, 2012; Covin et al., 2016). Given the challenges associated with 
capturing the essence of family firms, some authors have argued for a self-definition 
conceptualisation of family firms, where the principals in a business identify whether the 
firm is a family firm or not (Chua et al., 1999). In this paper, we operationalised family 
firms (Family firm) as those firms that the respondent self-identified as family firms when 
asked the question: “Do you consider the firm a family owned &/or managed company? 
Yes or No”. Hence, the questionnaire asked participating managers/owners whether their 
firms were family owned and/or managed or not. Thus, family firms were given a value 
of 1, and non-family firms were given a value of 0.  
Proactive orientation was assessed using the three items (alpha=0.72) developed 
by Covin and Slevin (1989) as a sub-scale of the entrepreneurial orientation construct (see 
Table 1 for the entrepreneurship scale). Specifically, the questionnaire asked firms to rate 
their degree of agreement along a 7-point Likert scale based on a continuum between two 
extreme characterisations of their firms’ behaviour where 4 indicates a neutral position. 
The three items that measured proactive orientation are items 4, 5, and 6 on the 
entrepreneurship scale in Table 1. 
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Table 1 about here 
Control Variables 
Our analysis controlled for multiple factors that can affect the extent to which 
firms use patenting relative to secrecy. To control for the effects of the country we 
included three binary variables (France, Denmark, United States) to capture the 
differences in these countries compared to Italy, which is used as the baseline.  
We controlled for a number of firm-level attributes. First, since proactive 
orientation is one of the three components of the broader construct of entrepreneurial 
orientation (Covin and Slevin, 1989), we also included the two other sub-scales of risk 
taking and innovativeness. Including the innovativeness sub-scale also allowed us to 
control for the firms’ investment in new product and process innovations. Consistent with 
Covin and Slevin (1989), each of these variables was based on three 7-point Likert scale 
items based on a continuum between two extreme characterisations of their firms 
behaviour where 4 indicates a neutral position and 1 and 7 represent the two extreme 
characterisations. Risk taking was measured as a response to items 7, 8 and 9 and 
innovativeness was measured using items 1, 2 and 3 in Table 1. For our sample, the 
coefficient alphas for the three items included in our measures for Risk taking and 
Innovativeness, respectively, were 0.90 and 0.86.  
To control for the influence of managers’ perceptions of firm brands, a control 
variable (Brand) was included based on a scale of five 7-point Likert-type items (1 = 
strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree; coefficient alpha = 0.85), which described the 
influence of different features of the company’s brand on its strategic decision-making 
process. Specifically, the five statements included the following: 1) Our company’s 
history influences how we make everyday business decisions, 2) We preserve the heritage 
of our brand when we make strategic decisions, 3) Preserving the timelessness of our 
brand is what we strive for when making key management decisions, 4) The values of 
our brand have not changed over time, and 5) We would rather be loyal to our company 
history than to change our branding in order to adapt to the market. 
The use of other methods for fostering firm competitiveness of products and 
processes was controlled for by adding four single-item variables (Designs, Copyrights, 
Organic, Lead Time) respectively based on responses to the question: “How effective 
were (a) design registrations, (b) copyrights, (c) organic certifications, and (d) lead time 
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advantages for maintaining or increasing firm competitiveness of products and processes 
over the last three years?” (1 = not used and 4 = high degree of effectiveness). 
Finally, we added a control for firm age, measured by the number of years since 
the firm was instituted (Firm age), and firm size, measured by the number of employees 
(Firm size). None of the firms in our sample had over 300 employees. Because some firms 
in the sample were only wineries or only vineyards, we also included two binary 
variables: Only winery equals 1 if the firm is only a winery and equals 0 otherwise; Only 
vineyard is coded as 1 if the firm is only a vineyard and 0 otherwise. In addition, because 
firms may exhibit different sensitivities to the use of trade secrets, depending on the nature 
of their business and, specifically in our sample, on the role of wine within the firm’s 
business scope, we included a dummy variable (Primary business), which takes value 1 
if wine is the firm’s primary business and zero otherwise.  
 
Results 
Figure 1 displays the percentage of firms that use secrecy and patenting by 
country. In all cases the percentage of firms that use secrecy is higher than the percentage 
of firms that use patenting. Figure 1 shows that Denmark has the highest percentage of 
firms using secrecy, followed by United States, and, lastly, by France and Italy. This order 
is consistent with La Porta et al.'s (1998) findings regarding the effect of  legal systems 
on preferences for patenting relative to secrecy across countries. Our analysis reveals that 
in countries with stronger legal enforcement systems, there is a greater reliance on secrecy 
than in countries with a weaker enforcement system. This is explained by the fact that in 
a strong IP system firms are more likely to be able to defend secrecy in a court case than 
in countries with a weak IP system. Alternatively, in a country with a weak IP system as 
the local legal framework, there is more room for interpretation in a secrecy case relative 
to a patent infringement case. 
Figure 1 about here 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analyses. The 
data reveals several interesting points. The mean value of Patenting/(Patenting+Secrecy) 
is 0.466, with a standard deviation of 0.115. Detailed data (not presented here but 
available from the authors upon request), show that 66% of the sample firms use the two 
equally, 9% use patenting more, whereas 25% of the firms use secrecy more than patents. 
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However, this preference for secrecy significantly varies across countries. Figure 2 shows 
that in Italy, only 4% of the firms opt for secrecy over patents, while in France 36% of 
the firms has a preference for secrecy, followed by Denmark (48%), and the United States, 
where more than half of the firms sampled (56%) prefer secrecy over patenting. The 
variable Proactive orientation is also shown to vary widely (from 3 to 21). In line with 
the prior evidence that wineries and vineyards are primarily family businesses, our data 
show that 87% of the sample are family firms.  
Figure 2 and Table 2 about here 
Correlation coefficients of the variables used in the estimations are reported in 
Table 3. None of the variables are sufficiently correlated to suggest multicollinearity 
problems in the data. However, to ensure that multicollinearity did not bias our results, 
we computed the average Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) of all the variables included 
in our model and all of them are below the threshold of 10 commonly recommended, 
confirming that multicollinearity does not appear to be an issue. Note that as proposed, 
the Family firm variable is positively correlated with our dependent variable, and 
proactive orientation is negatively correlated to the preference of patenting relative to 
secrecy.  
Tables 3 and 4 about here 
Table 4 displays the regression results. We employ Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
regressions to test our hypotheses. The independent variables were introduced one by one 
to test their significance. Specifically, Model 1 reports the results when only the control 
variables are included. In Model 2 we add the direct effect of the Family firm variable, 
and in Model 3 we add the direct effect of the Proactive orientation variable. Finally, 
Model 4 incorporates the interaction term of Proactive orientation*Family firm capturing 
the moderating effect of proactive orientation on the relationship between family versus 
non-family firms and the use of patenting over secrecy. 
Hypothesis 1 suggests that family SMEs (as compared to non-family SMEs) have 
a preference for patenting relative to secrecy as a means to protect and capture value from 
IP. In Model 2 of Table 4 the coefficient for the Family firm variable is positive and 
significant (β=0.046, p<0.05) using a two tailed test, providing support for Hypothesis 1. 
Hypothesis 2 focuses on the moderating effect of proactive orientation on the preference 
for patenting relative to secrecy in family SMEs relative to non-family SMEs. Using a 
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two tailed test the coefficient for Proactivenss*Family firm is negative and marginally 
significant (β=-0.007, p<0.10) in Model 4, providing partial supports for Hypothesis 2. 
This finding suggests that, as family firms’ proactive orientation increases, the preference 
of family firms for patenting relative to secrecy is mitigated. Figure 3 illustrates the 
moderating effect of SMEs’ proactive orientation.  
Figure 3 about here 
A number of our control variables are also significantly related to our dependent 
variable (Table 4). We find that, relative to Italy and France, Denmark and the United 
States have a lower preference for patenting relative to secrecy in line with the 
preliminary findings based on our descriptive statistics. Our data, therefore, support our 
contention that family firms prefer patenting relative to secrecy, although this preference 
is also influenced by country characteristics. The coefficient for Copyright is positive and 
significant in all models, thus suggesting that firms that consider copyrights to be 
effective mechanisms to protect IP have a higher preference for patenting relative to 
secrecy. On the contrary, we find that the Lead time variable is negative and significant 
in all the models, suggesting that firms that consider lead time a more effective 
mechanism to protect IP have a lower preference for patenting over secrecy. Firm size 
was revealed to be negative and significant, meaning that a lower predilection for 
patenting relative to secrecy is also contingent upon the number of employees. Finally, 
firms that are only vineyards have a higher preference for patenting over secrecy. 
 
Robustness check 
To ensure the robustness of the above findings, we conducted several additional 
analyses. First, to check that our model is robust to other model specifications, we ran a 
Tobit analysis, since our dependent variable ranges from 0.2 to 0.8. The robustness check 
supports our hypotheses, with coefficients keeping the same sign and significance levels 
of our reported findings (see Table 5 Models 1 and 2). Second, since France and Italy 
have similar legal systems (as pertains to weaker enforcement systems), we ran the 
regression analyses using a sub-sample consisting only of firms from these two countries. 
The pattern of proposed results for Hypothesis 1 and 2 were in the same direction and 
were statistically significant (p<0.01 and p<0.05 in Table 5 Models 3 and 4, respectively), 
providing additional support for our hypotheses. Third, we run a robustness test by 
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including another control variable related to the number of new products firms had 
developed over the past three years compared to their primary competitors as an 
additional control for their investment in innovation. To construct this variable, we asked 
participants the following question: “Compared to your primary competitors, how would 
you compare this company’s performance over the last three years, on a scale from 
1=worse to 4=much better, in terms of the number of new products developed?” We then 
included this variable in the regression with all of the variables incorporated in Model 4 
of Table 4, the results remained significant for our predictor variables at the same level, 
but this variable, new products was not significant (see Table 5 Models 5 and 6). This 
suggests that SMEs development of new products relative to their competitors in the wine 
industry does not affect the choice between patenting and secrecy as means of value 
protection and capture.  
Table 5 about here 
 
Discussion 
We combine the SME literature on the behavioural agency approach and 
entrepreneurial orientation with innovation research on IP rights to consider the family 
versus non-family SMEs preferences for mechanisms to protect and extract value from 
their IP, specifically secrecy and patenting. First, our results show that family SMEs in 
the wine industry (an industry known to exhibit a prevalence of SMEs) are more likely to 
prefer to protect their IP with formal methods, such as patents, rather than secrecy. These 
results support and extend existing research suggesting that family firms are more risk 
averse than non-family firms (Kraiczy et al., 2015; Zahra, 2005). We posit that family 
SMEs seek to protect the firm’s knowledge that underpins the SMEs successful 
performance and its socio-emotional wealth using patenting when possible, because 
doing so allows them to avoid risks associated with IP spillovers more common with the 
use of secrecy (Morris, 1998; Naldi et al., 2007). 
Second, we consider how SMEs’ proactive orientation can weaken family firms’ 
preference for patenting relative to secrecy as a means of value protection and capture. 
Previous literature has analysed the effect of family involvement, an informal institution, 
on the relationship between the strength of formal IP rights institutions in a country and 
the firm’s R&D resource allocation decisions (Brinkerink and Rondi, 2020). However, 
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R&D decisions are related to family firms’ inputs into the innovation process and not the 
mechanism they select to protect and capture the IP once it has been developed. Our 
results show that the decision of how to protect IP is much more complex than existing 
research would suggest. We extend this research by considering the preferences of family 
SMEs relative to non-family SMEs for choosing patents over secrecy to protect IP and 
how proactive orientation moderates this relationship. This research deepens our 
understanding of how SMEs make decisions about IP protection and provides insights 
into how innovation is protected and captured in family and non-family SMEs. The 
findings associated with the interaction term (Proactivenss*Family firm) suggest that, 
although family SMEs are more risk-averse and may seek to avoid risks associated with 
secrecy, the more proactive the SME, the more likely family firms are to adopt secrecy 
rather than patents to protect IP. Thus as proactive orientation increases the preference 
for family SMEs to use patents is weakened, i.e., they are more likely to choose secrecy 
over patents. 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
This article is not without limitations, primarily regarding the context and the 
methodology. Our context was the global wine industry, yet our sample only includes 
data from four countries, although many other countries have reputations for making wine 
(i.e., Spain, Germany, Argentina, etc.). We limited the number of countries in the sample 
due to the complexity of data collection, language issues, and increased coordination 
costs. Relatedly, the data collection from some of these four countries resulted in small 
sample sizes. However, the data come from two of the oldest wine-producing countries 
(France and Italy) and also from a country in which the wine industry is nascent 
(Denmark), strengthening the content validity of our results. Our measures also suggest 
that the multi-country data collected was internally reliable, and allowed us to control for 
differences in the country sub-samples. However, the data used in the study are from a 
single industry, the wine industry, which is agricultural in nature. SMEs engaging in the 
production of similar or associated industries in the agricultural sector (Fitz-Koch et al., 
2018) may be similarly influenced by family participation in their strategic choices to 
patent instead of choosing to use secrecy (Basco, 2014). However, we should be cautious 
in generalising our conclusions to other industries, particularly those not based on 
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agriculture. Yet, we posit that the wine industry is comparable to many industries 
dominated by SMEs, and thus serves as an appropriate context for the objectives of this 
article. We encourage future research to replicate and extend our contributions using 
larger samples, sampling from more countries, and different industry contexts.  
Family firms are heterogeneous, and we did not distinguish between different 
types of family firms (Howorth et al., 2010). For this article, we applied a broad definition 
of family firm and allowed our respondents to self-identify whether or not the firm was a 
family owned and/or managed company, since the wine industry is dominated by family-
owned and managed SMEs (Cordano et al., 2010; Thach, 2015; Williams and Spielmann, 
2019). We encourage future research to further explore the distinction between ownership 
and management. Additionally, we focused explicitly on SMEs’ proactive orientation as 
a driving factor of family firms’ preference for patenting relative to secrecy as a method 
for protecting their IP. We do so partly due to the strong link in the SME literature to the 
tendency for risk aversion in family firms and partly because less SME research has 
considered the effects of proactive orientation than risk taking and innovation. 
Nevertheless, we control for the other components of the broader construct of 
entrepreneurial orientation. We encourage researchers to further explore the relationship 
between the sub-scales of entrepreneurial orientation and SMEs’ preferences for methods 
to protect IP.  
Another caveat to our study relates to the preference for patenting since our 
theorising focuses on the extent in which patents (and trade secrets) are effective for 
maintaining or increasing firm competitiveness, but it does not directly address the 
question of whether SMEs are able to register a new patent. However, the ability to patent 
depends on three features: novelty, inventive step and industrial application. Certainly, 
wine recipes do possess these characteristics and are patentable. Furthermore, we know 
there has been a steep increase in recent years in the number of patents for wine (e.g. 
searching in Google for patents for “wine” and “recipe” shows 20,260 results), so wine 
recipes would be patentable, but firms might choose other IP protection mechanisms, 
particularly if they are small or cash constrained. Relatedly, although we could not control 
for R&D expenditures, we did include innovativeness in our model, to control for firms 
that might not patent because they do not invest in innovation. We also conducted a 
robustness test where we incorporated a second control for innovation (the number of 
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new products the firm developed in the past three years compared to their primary 
competitors) and our findings remained consistent and significant. 
Finally, this article focused on how family SMEs relative to non-family SMEs 
protect and capture value from IP using patenting rather than secrecy and how a proactive 
orientation weakens this relationship, contributing to the literature on innovation in family 
firms. We encourage future research to consider how other characteristics of family SMEs 
directly affect their preferences for patents versus secrecy, and how they moderate the 
relationship between family SMEs’ innovation inputs, such as R&D investments, and 
their preference for patents relative to secrecy. 
 
Conclusion 
Contributions to Theory 
The objective of this article was to investigate how family SMEs differ from non-
family SMEs in regards to their preferences for adopting patenting and secrecy. Our study 
finds that family SMEs are more likely to choose patenting relative to secrecy than non-
family SMEs. We also found that an increase in SMEs’ proactive orientation weakens 
this relationship. In other words, family SMEs that are led by highly proactive 
management are less likely to use patenting relative to secrecy.  
Our article contributes to the IP rights and SME literatures by explaining and 
empirically assessing firm characteristics that influence how effective family and non-
family SMEs consider patenting and secrecy for maintaining or increasing the 
competitiveness of their product and process innovations. Value capturing studies in the 
IP rights literature have focused primarily on country, industry, and innovation type, and 
have failed to recognise the impact of firm level characteristics upon this important 
strategic decision. In the same way, the SME literature has said little about the preferences 
of family SMEs relative to non-family SMEs for patenting relative to secrecy. This article 
addresses this gap in these literatures by considering the importance of two firm-level 
characteristics: family SMEs relative to non-family SMEs and their proactive orientation. 
In particular, we found that family SMEs (as compared to non-family SMEs) are 
associated with more use of patenting than secrecy as a means to maintain and increase 
their competitiveness and capture value from IP. Moreover, we found that increases in 
the proactive orientation of SMEs weakens the relationship between family SMEs 
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compared to non-family SMEs and their preferences for patenting relative to secrecy. Our 
findings therefore suggest that firm-level characteristics significantly contribute to our 
understanding of when SMEs use patents rather than secrecy, expanding the 
organisational factors identified by Bos et al. (2015) in the IP literature. 
We also extend the entrepreneurial orientation literature by considering how 
SMEs’ proactive orientation weakens the relationship between family and non-family 
SMEs and their assessment of how effective patenting is relative to secrecy as a method 
for maintaining or increasing the competitiveness of their product and process 
innovations. There are two contradictory streams of thought in literature regarding the 
innovative and entrepreneurial behaviour of family firms. We acknowledge the 
heterogeneity in family firms characteristics, and consider specifically how the level of 
proactive orientation differs across firms, while other scholars have found a number of 
factors, such as family dynamics (De Massis et al., 2014) and environmental factors 
(Casillas et al., 2011), that influence it. On this basis, we advocate that the methods firms 
use to capture value are moderated by the proactive orientation of the family SME. 
 
Contributions to Practice 
 In addition to deepening our theoretical understanding of how family SMEs make 
decisions regarding IP protection, our article also contributes to practice. Our results 
provide managers of family SMEs with greater insights into how decisions are made 
regarding strategies to protect IP and the impact that risk-aversion and proactive 
orientation have upon the use of secrecy. More specifically, it reveals that although family 
firms may be risk-averse, leading to more use of patents, when management is more 
proactive, family firms are less likely to prefer patents. We propose that the proactive 
orientation of family SMEs makes them focus more on possible opportunities to enhance 
and leverage the long-term viability and socio-emotional wealth of the business, by using 
secrecy as a means of value capture rather than taking the time and investing in the costs 
associated with protecting the firms’ IP using patenting. Thus family firms are 
encouraged to audit themselves in terms of proactive orientation before considering 
investing in patenting.  
In conclusion, this article extends our understanding of the firm-level factors that 
influence when SMEs are more likely to use formal IP instead of secrecy, as well as when 
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they are more likely to use secrecy instead of patenting. Our findings show that firm type, 
in terms of family versus non-family, and proactive orientation influence the likelihood 
that SMEs will choose patents over secrecy as a method to protect value of their IP. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Entrepreneurship scale by Covin and Slevin (1989) used in this study. 
Please rate the extent to which you agree with the following items related to your 
business’s strategic posture, with the number 4 indicating a neutral position. 
 
I1. In general, the top managers of my business unit favor… 
A strong emphasis on the 
marketing of tried and true 
products or services 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 A strong emphasis on R&D, 
technological leadership, and 
innovations 
I2. How many new lines of products or services has your business unit marketed during 
the past three years? 
No new lines of products or 
services 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Very many new lines of 
products or services 
I3. Changes in product or 
service lines have been mostly 
of a minor nature 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Changes in product or service 
lines have usually been quite 
dramatic 
P4. In dealing with its competitors, my business unit… 
Typically responds to actions 
which competitors initiate 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Typically initiates actions to 
which competitors respond 
P5.Is very seldom the first 
business to introduce new 
products/services, 
administrative techniques, 
operating technologies, etc. 




operating technologies, etc. 
P6. Typically seeks to avoid 
competitive clashes, preferring 
a “live-and-let-live” posture 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Typically adopts a very 
competitive “undo-the-
competitors” posture 
R7. In general, top managers of my business unit have… 
A strong proclivity for low risk 
projects (with normal and 
certain rates of return) 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 A strong proclivity for high risk 
projects (with chances for very 
high returns) 
R8. In general, the top managers of my business unit have… 
Owing to the nature of the 
environment, it is best to 
explore it gradually via 
cautious, incremental behaviour 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Owing to the nature of the 
environment, bold, wide-
ranging acts are necessary to 
achieve the firm’s objectives 
R9. When confronted with decision making situations involving uncertainty, my business 
unit… 
Typically adopts a cautious 
“wait and see” posture in order 
to minimise the probability of 
making costly decisions 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Typically adopts a bold, 
aggressive posture in order to 







Table 2: Descriptive statistics  
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Patenting/(Patenting+Secrecy) .466 .115 .2 .8 
Family firm .867 .340 0 1 
Proactive orientation 11.637 3.832 3 21 
Italy .457 .498 0 1 
France .357 .479 0 1 
Denmark .103 .304 0 1 
United States .083 .276 0 1 
Risk taking 11.19 4.328 3 21 
Innovativeness 11.593 5.059 3 21 
Brand 25.147 6.439 5 35 
Designs 1.57 .913 1 4 
Copyrights 1.34 .720 1 4 
Organic 1.92 1.199 1 4 
Leadtime 2.03 1.026 1 4 
Firm Age 50.883 67.849 0 760 
Firm Size 10.397 26.885 0 300 
Only Winery .073 .261 0 1 
Only Vineyard .047 .211 0 1 
Primarybusiness .917 .277 0 1 
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Table 3 Pairwise correlations 
Notes: 
- N=300;  
- Correlations greater than 0.110 or lower than -0.110 are statistically significant at the 0.05 level or lower 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 Patenting/(Patenting+Secrecy)  1.000 
                 
2 Family firm 0.199 1.000 
                
3 Proactive orientation -0.105 0.032 1.000 
               
4 Italy 0.209 -0.074 0.166 1.000 
              
5 France -0.088 -0.015 -0.207 -0.683 1.000 
             
6 Denmark -0.105 0.037 0.087 -0.311 -0.253 1.000 
            
7 United States -0.109 0.118 -0.034 -0.276 -0.225 -0.102 1.000 
           
8 Risk taking -0.830 0.035 0.654 -0.048 -0.097 0.211 0.023 1.000 
          
9 Innovativeness -0.011 -0.016 0.514 0.249 -0.235 0.062 -0.109 0.582 1.000 
         
10 Brand 0.143 0.120 -0.050 0.246 -0.107 -0.183 -0.056 -0.115 -0.064 1.000 
        
11 Designs 0.128 -0.056 0.086 0.168 -0.175 0.028 -0.030 0.055 0.110 0.045 1.000 
       
12 Copyrights 0.159 -0.033 0.122 0.050 -0.139 0.129 0.008 0.133 0.072 0.091 0.599 1.000 
      
13 Organic 0.050 -0.067 0.206 0.017 0.073 -0.032 -0.121 0.167 0.116 -0.052 0.081 0.101 1.000 
     
14 Leadtime -0.036 -0.084 0.336 0.313 -0.205 -0.106 -0.091 0.128 0.187 0.031 0.396 0.357 0.103 1.000 
    
15 Firm Age -0.026 -0.022 0.008 0.063 0.151 -0.198 -0.157 -0.008 0.020 -0.007 0.003 -0.013 0.039 0.031 1.000 
   
16 Firm Size -0.099 -0.158 0.194 0.098 -0.060 -0.118 0.057 0.057 -0.017 0.077 0.086 0.128 -0.000 0.178 0.130 1.000 
  
17 Only Winery -0.020 -0.266 0.020 0.127 -0.156 -0.095 0.147 0.053 0.109 -0.008 0.006 0.028 -0.067 0.054 0.004 0.054 1.000 
 
18 Only Vineyard 0.050 -0.006 -0.053 -0.108 -0.033 0.029 0.219 -0.068 -0.126 -0.034 -0.086 -0.083 -0.038 -0.053 -0.103 0.109 -0.062 1.000 
19 Primary business 0.006 0.024 -0.019 0.083 0.124 -0.373 0.047 -0.031 -0.029 0.104 0.069 0.059 -0.000 0.103 0.053 0.076 0.039 -0.048 
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Table 4: OLS regression results: dependent variable is Patenting/(Patenting+Secrecy) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Family firm  0.046** 0.048** 0.131** 
  [0.020] [0.021] [0.052] 
Proactive orientation   -0.003 0.003 
   [0.002] [0.004] 
Family firm* Proactive 
orientation    -0.007* 
    [0.004] 
France -0.047*** -0.046*** -0.049*** -0.050*** 
 [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] 
Denmark -0.095*** -0.097*** -0.098*** -0.102*** 
 [0.030] [0.030] [0.029] [0.030] 
United States -0.087*** -0.098*** -0.099*** -0.101*** 
 [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] 
Risk taking -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Innovativeness -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Brand 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Designs 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.007 
 [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] 
Copyrights 0.036** 0.036** 0.035** 0.035*** 
 [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.013] 
Organic 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 
 [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] 
Leadtime -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.018** -0.017** 
 [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] 
Firm Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Firm Size -0.001*** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Only Winery -0.007 0.010 0.008 0.005 
 [0.031] [0.032] [0.032] [0.033] 
Only Vineyard 0.064* 0.067** 0.066** 0.066** 
 [0.034] [0.032] [0.032] [0.033] 
Primary business -0.017 -0.019 -0.020 -0.021 
 [0.020] [0.021] [0.022] [0.022] 
Constant 0.483*** 0.453*** 0.466*** 0.406*** 
 [0.042] [0.044] [0.043] [0.056] 
R-squared 0.149 0.165 0.171 0.179 
Adj.R-squared .104 .118 .121 .127 
No of Obs 300 300 300 300 
F test 3.415*** 3.659*** 3.678*** 3.587*** 




Table 5: Robustness checks 
     Tobit Analysis                       France and Italy                 New Products 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Family firm 0.045** 0.132** 0.044** 0.152*** 0.046** 0.129** 
 [0.020] [0.051] [0.020] [0.052] [0.021] [0.053] 
Proactive orientation  0.003  0.005  0.003 
  [0.004]  [0.004]  [0.004] 
Family Firm* Proactive 
orientation  -0.008*  -0.010**  -0.007* 
  [0.004]  [0.004]  [0.004] 
France -0.047*** -0.051*** -0.045*** -0.048*** -0.046*** -0.049*** 
 [0.017] [0.016] [0.017] [0.016] [0.017] [0.016] 
Denmark -0.097*** -0.102***   -0.097*** -0.102*** 
 [0.029] [0.029]   [0.030] [0.030] 
United States -0.099*** -0.103***   -0.097*** -0.101*** 
 [0.027] [0.027]   [0.027] [0.027] 
New products     -0.005 -0.002 
     [0.010] [0.010] 
Risk taking -0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Innovativeness -0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Brand 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Designs 0.008 0.008 0.003 0.003 0.008 0.007 
 [0.011] [0.010] [0.012] [0.012] [0.010] [0.010] 
Copyrights 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.036** 0.035*** 
 [0.014] [0.014] [0.016] [0.015] [0.014] [0.013] 
Organic 0.005 0.006 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.005 
 [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005] 
Leadtime -0.022*** -0.018** -0.020*** -0.017** -0.020*** -0.017** 
 [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008] 
Firm Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Firm Size -0.000** -0.000** -0.001 -0.001* -0.000** -0.000** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Only Winery 0.010 0.004 0.002 -0.004 0.011 0.005 
 [0.033] [0.033] [0.036] [0.036] [0.032] [0.033] 
Only Vineyard 0.071** 0.070** 0.084* 0.081 0.068** 0.066** 
 [0.034] [0.034] [0.048] [0.050] [0.032] [0.033] 
Primary business -0.019 -0.022 -0.046*** -0.050*** -0.018 -0.021 
 [0.020] [0.022] [0.015] [0.019] [0.021] [0.022] 
Constant 0.452*** 0.405*** 0.489*** 0.424*** 0.457*** 0.408*** 
 [0.043] [0.056] [0.044] [0.056] [0.044] [0.057] 
R-squared   0.172 0.192 0.166 0.179 
Adj.R-squared   .121 .135 .116 .124 
sigma 0.109*** 0.108***     
 [.006] [0.006]     
No of Obs 300 300 244 244 300 300 
F test 3.669*** 3.618*** 3.256*** 3.091*** 3.876*** 3.718*** 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Figure 2: Degree to which Secrecy is used relative to patents. (Y-axis is calculated by 
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Figure 3: Moderator effect of SMEs’ proactive orientation. (Y-axis indicates the 
Patenting/(Patenting+Secrecy) variable) 
 
 
 
 
